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It probably comes as no surprise that home-buyers pay more for a property in high-income, 
‘educationally-rich’ neighbourhoods than they do for a similar property in poorer, low-
education neighbourhoods. Property crime rates may be lower, streets safer, the physical 
environment may be better maintained. More importantly for families, education in the 
community may matter because of the influence this has on children’s acquisition of 
education and life-skills. These effects include direct effects from adults to children through 
expectations, role models and skill transfers, alongside peer group effects that operate 
through interactions between children in the street and at school. 
 This study measures the price premium attracted by higher-education and higher 
income communities, using property price data from the Government Land Registry, 
qualifications data from the 1991 Census, and a commercial data set of local incomes 
provided by CACI Ltd.. This sample gives us near-universal coverage of property 
transactions and neighbourhood characteristics in England and Wales. Our approach is to 
estimate how property prices change from one neighbourhood to the next as the educational 
status of residents changes. We can place a common-sense interpretation on the change in 
household expenditure on property that proximity to more educated neighbourhoods 
generates: it is the value, in monetary terms, that a household places on improvements in 
educational levels in the community. This interpretation has a sound theoretical basis, and the 
technique has been used over many years for valuing environmental goods and the physical 
attributes of property. If we are prepared to assume that it is really the education of residents 
that matters – and our results suggest this – then we can infer households’ valuation of 
educational improvements in general. This leads us to a rough estimate of the local 
community benefits of improvements in education, expressed in monetary terms.  
 The main results show that property prices increase by one percent in the South and 
East of England, and by two percent in Wales, the West and North of England, for each one 
percentage point shift in the proportion of higher-educated residents. Because mean education 
levels differ across regions, this amounts to a 0.24 percent increase in prices for a one percent 
relative change in the education of an average community in any region. This is equivalent to 
about £156 on 1995 national mean prices. House prices move by 0.52 percent for each one 
percent change in local mean incomes. Using these figures, and taking into account the 
empirical relationship between individual earnings and education, we deduce that education 
is valued as a community commodity for reasons other than its impact on incomes. We find 
further, that education in adult residents matters over and above other community 
characteristics like unemployment rates, sick rates, lone-parenthood, age, crime rates and 
local primary school quality. Households pay more for community educational improvements 
in areas where there are more owner-occupier children. Also, the proportion of home-owners 
with children is higher in areas where there are fewer social tenants. From this, it seems that 
families value community educational status as an influence on children’s development and 
well-being. 
 We infer that households pay about £130 per year to purchase a ten percent 
improvement on average community education levels – from 19% to 20.9% higher-educated 
in 1995. This reflects the long-run, non-earnings related, community benefits of education. 
This monetary value of this benefit is at least as large as the estimates of the average private 
returns – the increment to earnings arising from educational improvement – which dominate 
the literature. Given the size of these effects, the community and other wider benefits of 
education deserve further analysis. Focussing only on the private returns risks seriously 
understating the value of education to society, and any policy decisions based on these 
returns alone may result in sub-optimal provision of educational services. 
 Note on methodology: A statistical association between property prices and local 
education levels or local incomes is not necessarily evidence of willingness to pay for 
neighbourhood educational status. Higher-income, more educated households will be 
clustered in areas with better quality housing and local amenities, simply because they can 
pay more for property than those on lower incomes. Property prices and the education of 
residents will both be higher in localities where there is high demand for educated workers. 
To overcome this problem, this paper uses two techniques. Firstly, we look only at 
differences between neighbourhoods which are very closely spatially associated, so 
minimising the geographical differences. Secondly, we predict neighbourhood education 
levels and incomes from the proportion and characteristics of residents in social housing. 
These are fixed prior to the period of our property price sample, so do not change in response 
to property price changes. And, there seems no reason to believe that owner-occupied 
housing quality, price, and home-buyer income varies in response to the local proportion in 
social housing – except through home-buyers perceptions of the dis-benefits of living near 
lower-educated, lower income people. Comparison with property-level price data that allows 
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Much of the existing empirical work on ‘neighbourhood effects’ focuses on estimation of the 
impact of a child’s neighbourhood on contemporaneous or subsequent outcomes – typically 
educational outcomes. The usual approach is to find micro data on family and neighbourhood 
characteristics in childhood, and on outcomes for children for these families, and to apply 
regression techniques to estimate the effects of neighbourhood conditional on family 
characteristics.1 One drawback of this approach is that the important neighbourhood and 
family characteristics are often highly correlated due to spatial residential sorting attributable 
to preferences, land prices and housing costs. What is more, the long-run impact of 
neighbourhoods may be underestimated if the characteristics of parents are in part attributable 
to historical neighbourhood-driven processes. Measurement of these effects of 
neighbourhood on human capital accumulation is critical for addressing issues of equality of 
opportunity and the distribution of education, earnings and work across geographical space. 
Nevertheless, by concentrating solely on these effects we risk ignoring other, potentially 
substantial, economic costs of neighbourhood deprivation. The obvious example is the cost 
associated with higher local crime rates in areas where household permanent incomes and 
employment expectations are low. 
A different strategy, adopted here, is to side-step measurement of direct effects on 
individual outcomes by looking at the overall value onwer-occupier residents place on good 
neighbourhoods. The model is a hedonic property price model of the type frequently used to 
value local amenities in the urban, environmental and housing economics literature, to 
estimate the implicit costs of neighbourhood educational and income deprivation. In a 
hedonic equilibrium, this implicit price amounts to a marginal valuation of the services 
provided by ‘educationally rich’ or high income neighbourhoods relative to ‘educationally 
poor’ or low-income neighbourhoods. These services may include neighbourhood-related 
inputs into the production of human capital in residents and their children, direct and indirect 
effects of local crime rates, and any other local consumption and production externalities. A 
number of theoretical models propose community sorting equilibria based on household 
preferences over some measure of the stock of human capital in the neighbourhood, or mean 
local incomes. Benabou (1993) assumes spillovers in the production of children’s human 
capital effect individuals’ willingness to pay for the proportion of high human capital 
communities, and those with higher marginal benefits bid up land rents in higher human 
wealth communities. In Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) higher income communities have 
higher quality education provided through higher local taxes, and in Nesheim (2001) 
consumers have preferences over the average schooling of residents, because this determines 
local school quality. The model in de Bartolome (1990) proposes sorting driven by 
willingness to pay for peer-group effects, though in his case the equilibrium property price 
premium does not reflect the price of the better peer group, but stops migration between 
communities in equilibrium. 
The approach taken in the current work assumes that evidence of a statistical 
relationship between neighbourhood status and property prices can be interpreted as average 
marginal willingness to pay for neighbourhood effects from education, incomes, or more 
general neighbourhood quality externalities. A central claim of this paper is that it is 
education and its wider benefits that count. The results show that local education is much 
more important in the determination of property prices than local incomes, and that it remains 
                                                 
1 For a survey see Gephart (1997). 
2 
a significant factor when other neighbour attributes – property crime, ethnicity, 
unemployment, lone parenthood and long-term sick rates – are taken into account. If we 
accept the evidence for this, then estimates of the implicit price of local educational 
composition amount to a measure of the marginal, external benefits of education in the 
community. On this basis, we can extend the analysis to explore the scale of the local social 
benefits of education in relation to the private returns typically estimated in the labour 
economics literature.  
A key assumption underlying this work is that differences in property prices between 
neighbourhoods that are closely spatially associated and are otherwise observationally similar 
can be attributed to differences in the educational composition of the neighbourhood. Clearly, 
any unobserved differences across neighbourhoods in their utility-bearing attributes – 
physical size and quality of housing, access to amenities for example – generates observed 
differences in educational composition. The quantity of any local normal good is correlated 
with local educational composition because education is a strong predictor of permanent 
income or lifetime wealth. In a regression of local property prices on local characteristics, 
educational composition is endogenous unless all utility-bearing local attributes are included 
in the regression. To address this problem, our empirical approach exploits variation in the 
proportion of social housing across neighbourhoods as an instrument for neighbourhood 
educational composition, and – as it turns out – more importantly, exploits variation between 
neighbourhoods that are closely spatially associated. 
Neighbourhood educational deprivation is measured as the proportion of highly 
qualified residents in postcode sectors in England and Wales, derived from the 1991 Census 
of Great Britain, 10% sample. This is the proportion of individuals with higher education 
qualifications, but is almost certainly correlated with local educational attainments in general. 
Although the proportion of higher-educated adult residents is fairly crude as a measure of 
educational deprivation, it does an adequate job of characterising the main differences 
between areas on the dimensions of deprivation embodied in the DETR Deprivation Indices 
2000. Since higher local educational attainments mean higher local average incomes, any 
association between local education levels and property prices generates a corresponding 
association between local incomes and property prices. A national local area incomes data 
set, collected in the late 1990s for marketing purposes, provides a unique opportunity for 
investigation of this relationship at this neighbourhood level. We will see that this 
relationship also holds with property-level transactions data using mean incomes at a broader 
level of geographic aggregation. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background to this work 
and sets it in context with its underlying concepts and existing literature. Section 3 outlines 
the standard hedonic property value model in the current context. Section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 explains the empirical methods used. Section 6 presents the results. Section 0 
concludes with an assessment of the size of community returns in relation to mean private 





2.1. Neighbourhood effects 
 
Residents value neighbourhood education levels and neighbourhood incomes because of the 
impact on a wide range of neighbourhood outcomes. Property crime rates may be lower, 
streets may be safer, the physical environment may be better maintained, gardens more 
pleasant, behaviour more orderly. More importantly for families, education levels in the 
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community may matter because of spillovers in the production of human capital in children. 
These spillovers include direct effects from adults to kids through expectations, role models 
and skills transfers – classified as collective socialisation effects in the sociological 
literature2. They also include peer group effects that operate through interactions between 
kids of similar age in the street and at school. These effects operate to increase the expected 
educational attainments of children with highly educated neighbours, relative to others. 
 Rather than specifying all these factors in detail, we may assume that mean 
education levels, or mean income provides a sufficient statistic for the distribution of an 
unobserved composite neighbourhood good which is the object of preference (aside from the 
physical attributes of housing) in the choice of residential location. Let us call the ranking of 
a neighbourhood on this scale its educational status. The sociological literature and the 
economics literature on educational externalities frequently refers to this type of composite 
commodity as social capital, but as conceived (Coleman, 1988), social capital describes 
social interactions and community organisational structures that are not exclusively linked to 
educational attainment of residents in the community. 
 
2.2. The social and community benefits of education 
 
Although neighbourhood deprivation is multi-faceted, the key factors are income and 
education. It is well established that educational attainment is one of the best single predictors 
of long run earnings and employment. Poor educational attainments obviously mean lower 
expected incomes for individuals and their families, but there are also high potential external 
costs. These external costs of neighbourhood deprivation in education mirror the external 
social benefits of education, which underpin the principle of public subsidy in educational 
provision. The Education Reform Act of 1870 which introduced compulsory, publicly funded 
schooling to Britain, was motivated by liberal conceptions of education’s place in a civilised 
and educated democracy, rather than the need for vocational skills. Nevertheless, most of the 
empirical work in labour economics and the economics of education focuses only on the 
private returns to education in the narrowest sense – the increment to earnings from 
additional time in education. Others have looked further at social returns conceived as 
external effects from human capital on production, which increase aggregate output. Whilst 
these are interesting issues from the perspective of policy directed to improving economic 
performance or addressing inequality, they say little about the value placed by society on the 
wider benefits education. 
Private returns to educational investments include all the benefits that accrue to the 
individual who undertakes the education – and the individual’s dependants if we are thinking 
of utility functions at the household level. Some private benefits, in particular increased 
productivity, have well defined markets and are, in principle, easily measured – the 
individual’s wage in the case of productivity. In most empirical studies, following early 
examples by such as Hansen (1963) and Mincer (1974), the private returns to education are 
measured as the increment to earnings from additional years of schooling or from discrete 
categories of educational attainment. Other private returns in the labour market include 
effects on employment, job-search, non-wage remuneration and job-satisfaction, though not 
all have explicit prices. But private returns also include a wide range of benefits that are not 
traded in any markets; Haveman and Wolfe (1984) provide a fairly exhaustive taxonomy. 
These non-market effects include productivity at home, own-health benefits, the enjoyment 
                                                 
2 Jencks and Mayer (1990). 
4 
value of leisure time, effects on the education and welfare of own offspring, effects on 
fertility, plus the consumption value of education. 
Social returns are usually defined as benefits to other members of society arising 
from an individual’s school achievements, or participation in higher education. There will be 
social benefits if there are externalities in production, whereby the productivity of others is 
increased by association with more educated workers – by more productive work relations, 
by direct transfers of knowledge, or where an educated community stimulates technical 
innovation. This type of model is popular in the growth literature, following Lucas (1988). 
Effects on production may also operate through externalities in human capital accumulation. 
Individual human capital accumulation may spill over to increase the human capital 
accumulation of other adults in the community, and the educational attainments of children 
outside the person’s own family. However, alongside these benefits which accrue to society 
through increased aggregate production and growth we must consider a catalogue of social 
benefits which are welfare improving, but which may have little or no effect on wages, or 
output. Most of these non-market social benefits are public goods that are more or less 
geographically localised:  social cohesion, citizenship, crime reduction, improved public 
health.  
These benefits, along with any productive externalities in the formation of human 
capital, are perhaps better referred to as the community benefits of education. These are the 
educational benefits addressed in this paper. 
The claim that education or income is the key characteristic of interest to households 
in the evaluation of neighbourhood quality – or is a sufficient statistic for neighbourhood 
quality – provides a basis for measuring the long-run, social, community-based returns to 
education. This needs some further justification. A reasonable counter-claim is that education 
merely proxies other behaviours of individuals which are unobserved in the data – drug 
abuse, vandalism, criminal activity – which impose costs on others in the neighbourhood. We 
must assume that these characteristics originate in lack of education and income:  if these 
characteristics are innate or otherwise fixed prior to educational decisions, and an 
individual’s educational attainments are determined by these characteristics, then we cannot 
infer the social returns this way. 
One possibility is that parental characteristics and social background generate initial 
conditions – psychological or economic – which inhibit an individual’s acquisition of 
education, or mean that any education acquired is valueless in the social context, even under 
a supportive policy regime. In this setting, educational policy will have relatively small 
effects on educational outcomes and will have few benefits in the short run. Nevertheless, 
there may be long run effects if even small improvements in the parents’ generation means a 
better setting for a child’s acquisition of education. If acquisition of education is mediated 
solely through genetic or other innate and unalterable characteristics, then we cannot interpret 
property price effects that originate in preferences for these characteristics or their benefits as 
monetary realisations of the social benefits of education. Property prices still reflect the 
perceived benefits of a neighbourhood ‘cleanup’, but the mechanisms for achieving this are 
not education-based. This view might, for example, find support amongst those who consider 
criminal behaviour as fundamentally innate, and that lower educational attainments amongst 
participants in crime is indicative of a preference for crime over legitimate activity. If the 
distribution of property prices and education levels are related through fear of crime, or the 
costs of attacks on property, then the implicit price of educational status measures a 
transformation of the social benefits of crime-reduction policy. 
Willingness to pay for higher-educated or high income neighbours will also 
overstate the community benefits of education if households place value on their location in 
the distribution of neighbourhood status. If high-education/high-income households 
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experience no direct costs from living amongst low-education/low-income households, but 
benefit solely from the status conferred by living in relatively wealthy neighbourhoods, then 
policies that increase educational attainments by compressing the distribution may 
inadvertently generate net social costs. 
 
2.3. Precedents in the literature 
 
2.3.1 Neighbourhoods and property value 
 
Estimation of neighbourhood incomes and educational status on property prices has a long 
history in the US. Many early studies of the factors affecting property values include some 
neighbourhood characteristics as covariates, though the response to neighbourhood is not 
usually the main parameter of interest. Some examples of early studies in the US literature 
that emphasise the role of neighbourhood externalities on property values follow. Kain and 
Quigley (1970) estimate that prices of owner-occupied housing increase by 7.8%, and rents 
increase by $2.55 for each additional year of mean adult education in the Census tract, using 
a small sample in St. Louis. Berry and Bednarz (1979) found that a $1 increase in median 
census tract incomes increases the value of single–family homes in Chicago by abut $0.70. 
Both studies condition on a number of neighbourhood and property attributes. Freeman 
(1979) emphasises the importance of socio-economic and other neighbourhood variables as 
determinants of property values. 
A number of studies look specifically at the effect of social housing projects and 
other property development on local property prices. An early example is Schaffer (1972), 
who looks at the impact of housing construction for low income families under the US 1961 
“Below Market Interest Rate” scheme using treatment and control sites in Los Angeles. He 
finds no significant difference between the price trends at the two sites, probably due to the 
fact that most of the new residents already lived locally. Ding, Simons et al. (2000) are more 
concerned with the impact of local residential investment on property prices. Using data on 
Cleveland, Ohio, they find a $0.87 increase in property prices with each $1 of median census 
tract income (in 1990) corresponding to an elasticity of 0.36 at the sample mean. Their 
estimates also imply an elasticity of –0.04 with respect to the census tract proportion of 
African-Americans. They also report a negative, but insignificant effect from the proportion 
in poverty. Crime rates attract a strong negative coefficient, corresponding to an elasticity of 
–0.13. 
Munneke and Slawson (1999) are interested in potential negative externalities from 
mobile home parks in one parish in Louisiana and estimate a two-step selectivity model to 
adjust for the endogeneity of mobile home park location. Location within 0.25 miles of a 
mobile home park in a residential area leads to a 5% decline in the value of a single family 
dwelling, relative to properties located between 0.25 and 0.5 miles radius. They offer no 
theory as to the cause of this externality, but the perceived type of mobile home residents is 
presumably a key issue. Two other recent studies investigate the impact of social housing 
programs in the US. Lee, Culhane et al. (1999) consider the effect of public and assisted 
housing on property values in Philadelphia. The authors of the first paper find negative 
effects from proximity to public housing developments and other assisted housing schemes, 
but these effects largely disappear, or their sign is reversed once neighbourhood composition 
controls are included. They find no statistically significant effects from the physical type of 
development, which suggests that it is the characteristics of residents and not the physical 
structure of social housing that generates the externality. Log property prices increase by 
1.6% for each thousand dollars of neighbourhood median incomes – an elasticity of 0.41. 
Galster, Tatian et al. (1999) look at the impact on property prices of neighbours in receipt of 
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“Section 8” certificates, which entitle low-income households to a housing subsidy. They use 
a model with spatial fixed neighbourhood effects to find heterogeneous impacts from assisted 
housing programs in Baltimore, with adverse effects in lower price areas, but positive 
impacts from small-scale programs in higher valued tracts. Interestingly, the authors 
conducted focus group studies in four communities with distinct socio-economic 
compositions, to gauge residents’ opinions of social housing developments. Some 
respondents expressed sensitivity to the physical condition of rental accommodation, with a 
fear that assisted housing brought physical decay and vandalism. Many groups expressed 
clear antipathy to problem tenants, believing that those in socially assisted housing had 
different values and standards than what the current residents desired for their 
neighbourhood. Many feared that subsidised housing brought increased crime. 
Few studies on the value of neighbourhoods exist for Britain – due to the lack of 
data. One example is Cheshire and Sheppard (1995), who find positive amenity values in 
Reading from local schools, the proportion of white collar workers and the proportion in non-
Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups. They estimate aggregate land values (over the geographical 
space of their sample) of £43,430 attributable to schools, and £81,820 attributable to social 
and ethnic composition, but offer no estimate of the mean benefits per household. 
 
2.3.2. The social and non-market returns to education 
 
No existing studies propose a link between the willingness to pay for good neighbourhoods 
and the measurement of community benefits of education. However, there are a number of 
approaches to measuring other benefits beyond the traditional private market returns on 
earnings. Since Lucas (1988), who discussed the potential role of human capital externalities 
in economic growth, a strand of empirical research has emerged which has tried to measure 
the impact of state, region or country average education levels on wages, productivity and 
growth. A few examples will give the flavour of this research programme.  
Weale (1992) uses private returns and international comparisons of growth rates and 
educational attainments to suggest that long run social returns incorporating spillover effects 
on growth rates could be two to three times the magnitude of the private returns. Jaffe (1989) 
looks at the social rate of return to university research in the form of state-specific spillovers 
into corporate patents, and finds positive effects with elasticities as high as 0.3 in some 
industries. Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) find strong effects on wages from state education 
levels, conditional on individual education using OLS estimates on US Census data, but these 
social returns become weak and insignificant once they instrument the educational variables 
with state compulsory school attendance laws and individual date of birth effects. Ciccone 
and Peri (2000) find negative effects from city education levels on individual wages using 
data from 173 US cities in 1970, 1980 and 1990. Using data on average wages in cities, they 
find insignificant, near-zero, effects on wages, but small positive effects on productivity of 
around 1%.  
More directly related to the work in hand is Haveman and Wolfe (1984), who 
present a meta-analysis of earlier work to compute an approximate figure for the annual value 
of an additional year of schooling based on non-marketed effects on the production of 
children’s cognitive development, contraceptive use, efficient budget allocations, criminal 
apprehension and health. Their technique is based on obtaining the shadow price of the non-
marketed input from the ratio of its marginal product to that of another, marketed input with a 
known price. Their figures suggest a value of social and private non-marketed benefits in the 
order of $5000 in 1975 – a value of a similar order to the annual value of a year of schooling 
in standard private rate-of-return estimates. 
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3. The Hedonic Model 
 
We shall use a standard hedonic property value framework to assess the implicit price of 
neighbourhood educational and income composition. This framework has been employed 
frequently in the environmental, land and urban economics literature to price local 
environmental amenities. Individuals are assumed to have weakly separable preferences over 
a set of housing and location characteristics. A dwelling comprises a bundle of these 
attributes. Sellers and buyers with different incomes and different preferences over local 
school performance and other property characteristics are matched efficiently by the property 
market. This leads to an implicit price surface that traces out the locus of efficient 
transactions in price-characteristics space. See Rosen (1974) for the classic exposition. 
 Following the standard hedonic, property value model, we specify household 
preferences as:   
 
( )( )lq,,,, xyxcUU c=  (1)
where c is a numeraire composite consumption commodity, x is the measure of 
neighbourhood status – either the neighbourhood proportion higher-educated or log mean 
neighbourhood incomes – ( )xy c  is a human capital production function for children in the 
household, q is a vector of structural housing characteristics, l is a vector of locational 
characteristics. House prices are determined as a function of the same attributes, where the 
attributes are traded at a set of exogenous prices θ fixed by demand and supply equilibrium at 
a broader geographical level: 
 
( )θ;,, lqxPP hh =  (2)
The household lifetime budget constraint is: 
 
( )θ;,, lqxPcy h+=  (3)
Assuming the choice space is continuous so that households can purchase their optimum 












This standard condition justifies the use of an estimated implicit price function ( )⋅hP  in the 
estimate of the marginal willingness to pay for local educational status. If consumers are 
heterogeneous in their marginal benefits from x then stratification into high and low x 
communities can occur, and ( )⋅hP  can be non-linear in x.  Without information on human 
capital of children, it is not possible to identify separate contributions of educational status to 
human capital formation and consumption value in the implicit price, only the sum of the 
marginal benefits. But, given an appropriate specification of hP and individual level data on 
house prices, neighbourhood, housing and locational characteristics, it is possible to estimate 
the overall willingness to pay for marginal improvements in neighbourhood educational 
status or local mean incomes, for given neighbourhood quality x. 
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In the case where the community is valued purely as an input into the production of 
children’s human capital and lifetime wealth, marginal willingness of parents to pay for x will 
be the marginal effect on the present value of their children’s total future earnings. Because 
of its local public good nature, families with more children are willing to pay more for 
neighbourhoods with high levels of our commodity. Families will bid up the price of 
improvements in the neighbourhood until the marginal cost equals the sum of the marginal 
benefits over all their children. The alternative is to divide expenditures on private goods that 
improve the welfare of children, or to distribute income directly to children in the form of 
transfers. An implication of this is that the average number of children per household, or the 
proportion of households with children in a neighbourhood, will be increasing as 
neighbourhood status increases exogenously. It follows that the implicit price of 
neighbourhood quality will increase as the mean number of children per family increases. 
 
 
4. Description of the Data 
 
Since the empirical methods are designed to suit the data, it will help to describe the data 
first. British data on individual property transactions with local area identifiers is not readily 
available. Instead, we must use locally aggregated data available from the Government Land 
Registry. This covers most market value property transactions in England and Wales, 
aggregated to postcode sector level. In the UK, postcodes contain up to seven alphanumeric 
characters, and contain four hierarchical components. The first two alphabetic characters 
define the postcode area, the broadest postal zone. Examples are N, EX YO representing 
North London, Exeter, York. Within postcode areas, the next level down is the postcode 
district. A single or two-digit number following the postcode area defines this. Examples are 
N6, EX24, and YO10. A single letter further subdivides some postcode districts in central 
London. Below this, we have postcode sectors. This is the unit of observation in our house 
price data set, and the unit adopted here as a neighbourhood identifier. 
This Land Registry data is disaggregated by property type – detached, semi-
detached, terraced, flat/maisonette – but this is the only information provided about the 
characteristics of properties included in the price data. At the time of writing, this data set is 
available from 1995 to 2000. It contains mean house prices and total sales volumes for each 
dwelling type in each postcode sector, where annual sales numbered 3 or more. Properties 
under £10,000 and over £1,000,000 are excluded. This amounted to only 0.5% of all property 
sales in 1999. Sales at non-market value transactions are also excluded. This is an advantage 
in our application, because market prices will not be contaminated by discounted sales of 
council houses to tenants under the Right to Buy scheme introduced in the 1980s. 
Micro-spatially aggregated data has an advantage over property level data in the 
current application because we are only interested in the variation in prices attributable to 
mean neighbourhood characteristics. What we do need though are property prices and 
neighbourhood attributes at the same level of disaggregation. Sources of information on 
educational deprivation in local areas are limited. The most up to date data is combined into 
the Education, Skills and Training domain of the DETR Indices of Local Deprivation 2000.3 
This index is generated at census ward level, not postcode sector level and there is no 
correspondence between these two geographies. An alternative source is the 1991 Census 
                                                 
3 This index combines a number of dimensions of educational deprivation – working age adults without jobs, 
over-16s not in full time education (DSS), applicants for higher education (UCAS), primary school 
performance, children with English as an additional language, and primary school absenteeism. 
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Small Area Statistics. This provides a count of the number of over-18s with degrees, 
diplomas and other high qualifications, based on a 10% sub-sample of the census population.4 
The age of the census data and the 10% sampling scheme are a drawback, but in 
compensation we have a straightforward interpretation of the relationship between property 
prices and the proportion of highly qualified adults, and the fact that re-aggregation to 
postcode-sector level rates is fairly straightforward. The 1991 census also provides an 
accurate measure of the proportion of households in social housing – required as an 
instrument for educational status – plus grid references, housing and various other local 
characteristics. For the central results presented in this paper, I match the Land Registry 
property price data to 1991 census data, re-aggregated from Enumeration District level to 
postcode sector level using the Postcode-Enumeration District lookup tables available from 
the Census Dissemination Unit. 
Local income data for Britain is also scarce. For this we must turn to a commercial 
data set produced by CACI Ltd. for marketing purposes. Their survey is available for 1996, 
1999 and 2000 (though only the 1996 and 1999 surveys are used here) and each wave is 
based on over 4 million households. Incomes are modelled by CACI down to individual 
postcode level using 1991 census data. A postcode sector comprises 2700 households on 
average. In 1999, the mean number of actual observations of incomes used for the postcode 
sector mean (not imputed) is 436 with a sample mean income of £21,860 and a standard 
deviation of household incomes of £15,000. The standard error of the postcode sector mean 
would be around £720, or 3.3% of the overall mean. This gives some confidence that the 
data, although partially imputed, is reliable at postcode sector level.5  
More data on property values is available from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders, an 
annual 5% sample (around 25000) of mortgage transactions. This has the advantage of 
property level prices, dwelling characteristics and total household incomes, but the 
disadvantage of broader, Local Authority geographical identifiers. Still, we can use estimates 
from this data set for comparison with the baseline results. 
 
 
5. Empirical Methods 
 
5.1. Empirical model 
 
As discussed above, our property price data set has no household level data. Instead, in the 
Land Registry data set, annual housing transactions are aggregated to provide an average of 
prices in four property-type categories at postcode sector level. A sample of k transactions on 
a house of type r will contain a mix of structural characteristics q. Assuming that the sample 
value of the price of houses of type r, in postcode sector i, at time t, with mean characteristics 
q  is the market price of a representative property, then the household hedonic price function 
is representable by a hedonic price function at the neighbourhood-house-type level. There is 
                                                 
4 The relevant question is number 19 in the Census form, which asks for details of post-compulsory-age 
educational qualifications of all persons over the age of 18 in the household on Census night (21-22 April 1991). 
The Census Small Area Statistics contain counts of persons with higher degrees, degrees, or diplomas, nursing 
or teaching qualifications, based on a random sample of 10% of the responses from each Census Enumeration 
District (a much smaller geographical unit than the postcode sector). 
5 As a safety check, we can compare the CACI data with New Earnings Survey data for 1995/1996. 
Unfortunately the NES records postcode of employment, not residence, and includes earnings only, not family 
incomes, so we would only expect moderate correlation. Aggregating to postcode district level, we find a 
correlation coefficient of 0.36. At postcode area level, this increases to 0.77. 
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no detailed information on structural characteristics for our sample of house transactions. One 
option is to proxy the characteristics with census data on owner occupied housing in 1991. 
The only census variables which could reasonably be treated as exogenous – not, like housing 
amenities, subject to change in response to shifts in residential composition – are those that 
give the distribution of rooms across households in the postcode sector. 
In the tradition of the property value literature, the models presented here use the 
natural logarithm of property prices as the dependent variable. An unknown function ( )tg i ,l  
maps locational characteristics to house price in each time period. This specification 
obviously imposes the constraint of a constant percentage response in house prices to a one 
percentage point absolute increase in the proportion of qualified residents, or a constant 
elasticity with respect to local incomes. Entering education linearly, and income in natural 
logs, is consistent with the usual Mincer-type earnings function which specifies log incomes 
as linear in educational attainments. The specification of the log-price of a house of type r  in 
neighbourhood i  at time t  is then: 
 
( ) irtriitxirt uhtgxβP ++++= ,ln lα  (5)
where there are fixed effects for the four housing types rh . 
 
5.2. Estimation strategy 
 
Estimation of a full structural specification of the mapping of neighbourhood characteristics l 
to house prices requires data on local amenities, local housing characteristics, the proximity 
of neighbourhoods to transport services, local labour demand, environmental quality and 
other unknown local goods. The function ( )tg i ,l  could then be replaced by a specific function 
of available covariates. This is the traditional method used in property value models, with ad-
hoc inclusion of a broad, though potentially incomplete, set of explanatory variables. In the 
absence of this data and any prior knowledge about exactly what should be included, we can 
replace the mapping of l to house prices with some specification that maps neighbourhood to 
house prices through the location of the neighbourhood in geographical space and time. 
The approach adopted here is to estimate ( )tg i ,l  as a spatial fixed effect using a non-
parametric kernel regression procedure. This estimates the average value of property prices 
and the regressors at a postcode sector, as a distance-weighted average of the values in the 
surrounding postcode sectors. Estimation is then based on linear regression using the 
deviations of the observed values of property prices and the regressors from the estimated 
expected value surfaces over geographical space. The grid reference co-ordinates of a 
geometric central point in postcode sector determine the spatial location of an observation 
and the weights that should be applied to other observations. Observations in closer proximity 
receive the highest weights. The advantage of this method over, say, using dummy variables 
for groups of postcode sectors in close proximity, is that it centres the comparison group on 
the observation postcode sector and allows flexibility in the choice of group radius. This 
amounts to deciding on a bandwidth b for the kernel, which will determine how rapidly the 
weights decrease as we move away in space from a given neighbourhood observation. Where 
there is more than one year of data, we can allow time effects via a separate non-parametric 
surface for each period, so: 
 
( ) ( )∑ ⋅=
t
itti gdtg ll ,  (6) 
11 
where td  is a time dummy. This allows for differential growth in house prices across 
geographical space. 
This smooth spatial effects estimator (SSE) is also used in Gibbons and Machin 
(2001) for pricing primary school performance. Expressing the model in deviation from 
estimated expected values, given the spatial location, c1, c2 and the choice of bandwidth 
b for the comparison group: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] irtirtirtititirtirt bmbxmxβbPmP ϖ+−′+−=− ,|,|,|lnln cwwcc γ
 
(7) 
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where Β  is a 2 × 2 bandwidth matrix, e.g. 22 I×b , and {}⋅k is a multivariate kernel. For the 
Gaussian kernel this is { } { }vv 5.0exp2 1 −= −πk . Parameters γβ , and their variance covariance 
matrix can then be estimated by OLS on the transformed variables. 
As the bandwidth b tends towards zero, the estimator approaches an estimator with 
postcode sector fixed effects. Since we have no time-series variation in the Census education 
measure, and very little in our incomes data (98.3% of the variation is cross-sectional), this is 
inappropriate. At the other extreme, an infinite bandwidth is equivalent to the OLS estimator, 
with the function ( )ig l  estimating a constant. Since there is enormous variation in postcode 
sector land areas and household density, a common bandwidth for all observations will lead 
to inconsistent estimates. The estimated price and regressor surfaces will be over-smoothed in 
areas of high household density and low land area postcode sectors, and under-smoothed in 
rural areas. Consequently, we must weight the neighbourhood bandwidth using data on 
household density matched in from the 1991 Census. Fixing the number of households n in a 






=  (9) 
The baseline results in the paper use bandwidths corresponding to 3400 households, but 
comparisons are made with other bandwidth choices6. Sensitivity to bandwidth choice can be 
tested by the usual Hausman test for equivalence of parameters in alternative estimators. Too 
narrow a bandwidth gives a consistent but inefficient estimator; too wide a bandwidth results 
in inconsistent estimates. 
                                                 
6 Hardle (1990) presents bandwidth adjustment factors for comparing smoothers using different kernels. The 
43% downward adjustment is based on achieving similar smoothing to a uniform kernel with unit bandwidth, 
i.e. if we want equivalent smoothing to a uniform kernel of radius equal, on average, to two postcode sectors 
(6000 households) we need a Gaussian bandwidth of 0.57*6000 = 3420 households. 
12 
As will be discussed in Section 5.4, we need instruments to identify the implicit 
prices. In IV estimation, instruments are taken as deviations from the estimated local means. 
The final partial linear smooth spatial fixed effects IV estimator is: 
 
( ) ( ) pZZZZXXZZZZX ~~~ˆ~~~~~~ˆ~~~ˆ 111 −−−− ′′ ′′′= ΩΩIVSSEβ  (10) 
where X is the regressor matrix, Z is the full instrument matrix and p the house-price vector. 
The tilde indicates deviations from the non-parametric estimates of the smoothed surface 
means in the smooth spatial effect models. I estimate the matrix ZZ ~ˆ~ Ω′  using the Huber-
White method, with clustering on postcode sectors to allow for the fact that we have multiple 
house type (and sometimes time periods) in each postcode sector. The variance covariance 
matrix is estimated by the inverse of the first term in square brackets.7 
 
5.3. Estimation of non-linear responses to neighbourhood composition 
 
The model in (5) imposes a log-linear relationship between property prices and the proportion 
of highly qualified neighbours. Some empirical verification of this assumption is in order. 
Non-linearities in the implicit price function will have implications for evaluation of the 
aggregate social benefits of an increase in educational attainments. Evidence of non-
linearities may enrich the empirical analysis by revealing threshold effects in the spirit of 
‘contagion’ theories of neighbourhood deprivation which have been popular in the 
sociological literature – see Jencks and Mayer (1990) or Crane (1991). If contagion or 
epidemic theories are correct then home-owners should be indifferent to neighbourhood 
educational composition until education levels fall below some critical threshold. 
In order to check for such non-linearities we must generalise the semi-parametric estimation 
procedure above, to estimate: 
 
( ) iriiiiir ubccxgP +′+= irwγ,,,ln 21  (11) 
Visual representation of the relationship between iPln and ix  is infeasible in the general case. 
Instead, a function ( )xh  can be estimated as the average relationship between expected prices 
and ix , averaging over the distribution of spatial co-ordinates, i.e. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫=
C
iiii dcdcccfbccxgbxh 212121 ,,,,,  (12) 
 
where C is the support of ( )ii cc 21 ,  in the sample, and ( )ii ccf 21 ,  is their joint density. The 
computational procedure is as follows: 
 
1. Estimate the linear coefficients γ in the model (13) below, replacing ( )⋅m  with a 3-
regressor kernel regression estimates with observation-dependent bandwidths ib  for 
21 ,cc , and a fixed bandwidth for x : 
                                                 
7 I compare with bootstrap standard error estimates in one case to assess the accuracy of the standard errors. 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ] irtirtirtirtirt bxmbxPmP ϖ+−′=− ,,|,,|lnln cwwc γ  (13) 
2. Estimate ( )xhmˆ  by kernel regression of ( )irwγˆln ′−irP  on 21 ,, ccx  at a number of grid 
points gx& , all at a fixed co-ordinate-pair ( )mm cc 21 , && . This co-ordinate pair is drawn at 
random from the sample. 
 
3. Re-calculate ( )xhmˆ  at M different co-ordinate pairs drawn at random from the sample. 
 








1ˆ , that is the average of the M kernel regressions over the sub-
sample of randomly chosen, within-sample, spatial locations at which the estimated joint 
density ( ) 0,, 21 ≠ccxf . 
 
Since in this application, educational composition x  is treated as endogenous (see Section 
5.4 below), it is replaced by the generated regressor: 
 
( ) riiiii hbcczxx ˆˆ,,,ˆˆ 21 +′+= iwγ  (14) 
where z  is a suitable instrument, ( )iiii bcczx ,,,ˆ 21  is estimated by kernel regression, and the 
other parameters are estimated using the partial linear model described above. If ( )xh ˆˆ  is to be 
a good representation of ( )xhˆ , we require that the instrument is continuous, is a strong 
predictor of x , and that xˆ has a similar support to x . As discussed in Section 5.4, the 
proportion of social tenants is the main instrument, and this satisfies these requirements. 
Rilstone (1996) discusses the use of generated regressors in non-parametric estimators, and 
their asymptotic properties.8  
 
5.4. Identification strategy 
 
Inclusion of any household personal characteristics on the right hand side of a hedonic model 
causes problems. The ability of households to move across space implies that household 
characteristics are almost certainly endogenous in a property price equation – variation in 
unobserved determinants of property prices drives the variation in characteristics of residents. 
Interpretation of estimated coefficients on household or individual characteristics is difficult, 
and their inclusion can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the parameters of interest. 
This is particularly true of characteristics that are highly correlated with household income, in 
that lower land prices will attract those with lower incomes.  
An analogous problem arises if we include community characteristics that are 
correlated with home-owner household incomes. The household level relationship between 
incomes and housing expenditure is replicated at an aggregate level if we include local mean 
incomes, or other local demographics that are correlated with household incomes. A 
                                                 
8 Note that no adjustment is made to the confidence intervals to take account of this generated regressor. Since 
the asymptotic distribution of this semi-parametric estimator is complex, I compare the analytical standard 
errors with bootstrap estimates for one case – see Appendix C. The additional computational effort required to 
compute bootstrap standard errors for all the estimates is hardly worthwhile, since the main purpose of the 
exercise is to show up any non-linearities in ( )xh . 
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regression of property prices on local mean income gives us a parameter estimate which 
measures the response of property expenditure to own income, rather than home-owners’ 
valuation of local incomes as a commodity. Similarly, neighbourhood education levels will 
be highly correlated with own wealth or permanent components of income. 
The structure of the problem is common to all endogenous regressor models. The 
relationship of interest is: 
 
( ) irtitriitxirt htgxβP ερνα +++++= ,ln l  (15)
Where itν  is the component of neighbourhood choice which is observed to property buyers, 
but unobserved to the econometrician, and itε  represents components of property price 
formation which are unobserved to both – optimisation errors, local estate agent activities for 
example. But neighbourhood status x is partly determined by migration of home-owners 
between neighbourhoods, because of selection on unobserved components in the 
determination of property prices, underlying land prices or structural differences for example. 
 
( ) ititiitit tgzx ξνλφ +++′+= ,l  (16)
Hence, [ ] 0| ≠+ ititrit xE ξρν  and regression estimates are biased. Identification of the implicit 
price of a local amenity which is not exogenous to other determinants of residential land and 
building values requires one of two strategies. Firstly, we can saturate the model with 
property descriptors and exogenous local characteristics, in the hope that unobserved 
determinants of property prices are purely random, and not driven by unobserved housing 
characteristics or local amenities, i.e. [ ] 0| =+ ititrit xE ξρν , so 0=itν . This is the method 
implicitly adopted by most researchers in the housing economics field, hence the extended 
vector of covariates presented in many property-value models. This type of estimator tries to 
achieve conditional independence of the error term and the characteristic of interest9. The 
weakness of this approach is that we need a lot of property characteristics and, in the absence 
of any spatial controls, a fully specified model of local determinants of land price – distance 
to the central business district, distance to modes of transport, distance to other local 
amenities. Since property characteristics exhibit a high degree of mutual correlation, 
interpretation of the parameters can be difficult. What is more, the determinants of property 
prices which are left unobserved to the researcher must also be unobserved to property 
buyers, or considered irrelevant, if they are to be truly exogenous to incomes. Expenditure on 
any attributes of the local environment or physical structure of local properties, which are 
normal goods and are observed by buyers, will be positively correlated with incomes. 
Estimation on differences from local expected values partly overcomes the 
identification problem by removing most of the variation attributable to local labour markets, 
local environmental goods, and transport services. This assumes that itν  is subsumed in 
( )tg i ,l . A more robust approach is to combine this estimation strategy with instrumental 
variables for the local characteristic of interest, using some columns of the vector itz . In the 
current context, we need local characteristics which are correlated with local educational 
composition or local incomes, but which affect the education and incomes of home buyers 
only through their influence on local education or income, valued as an amenity. Candidate 
                                                 
9 This traditional regression approach is analogous to matching estimators of treatment effects, but with 
restrictions on functional form. 
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instruments are the proportion and characteristics of households in social housing – see 
Appendix A. The identifying assumption is that the incomes of home-owners are locally 
uncorrelated with the proportion, incomes and education of tenants in social housing – except 
in so far as the presence of low-income, low education tenants in social housing generates an 
externality that home buyers are willing to pay to avoid. The presence of capital market 
constraints dictates that home-owner incomes will also be lower in areas with high 
proportions of social housing, but only because of the influence of the neighbourhood on 
property prices. 
Although the proportion of social tenants is a satisfactory instrument for educational 
attainments and local incomes, we would prefer some over-identification, if only to allow a 
test of the specification. Any characteristics of social tenants which are correlated with 
educational attainments and incomes (conditional on the proportion of social tenants) will 
suffice. As it turns out, a good additional instrument is the proportion of social tenants from 
ethnic groups originating in the Indian sub-continent. These groups have, on average, higher 
qualifications than social tenants from other ethnic groups, but the proportion of these groups 
is uncorrelated with property prices once we control for local ethnic composition in the 





6.1 Summary and assessment of the data 
 
6.1.1. Property price data 
 
The results in this paper are presented separately for three broad geographical regions of 
England and Wales. These regions correspond to grouped Standard Statistical Regions: 
 
East and South East:   London, South East (rest), East Anglia 
Wales, West and South West:  West Midlands, South West, Wales 
The North:    East Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, 
     North, North West 
 
This scheme separates areas with widely differing property market characteristics, but retains 
a mix of rural, urban and metropolitan geographies in each group. This enables investigation 
of differences across regions, without over complicating the presentation of results. Roughly 
speaking, these areas are grouped according to property price growth in the late 1990s. 
Table 1 summarises the main variables in our data set. The property price sample 
includes only those properties with recorded postcodes. This sub-sample under represents 
higher price properties in 1996 when compared with the full sample used by the Land 
Registry or the random 5% sample conducted by the Society of Mortgage Lenders. The 
postcode sector data under-represents higher priced detached houses and flats in all regions, 
probably because it under represents new high-end properties. The Land Registry confirmed 
that many new properties are registered without postcodes, so are missing from the postcode 
sector level data. The censoring of these groups in the dependent variable has the potential to 
downward bias our regression estimates. Given that the difference between the means in the 




6.1.2. Neighbourhood education data 
 
The Indices of Deprivation 2000 published by the DETR provide the most up to date 
indicators of deprivation in education, income, employment, health and housing, child 
poverty, and access to services. The ward level basis of these indices is not compatible with 
our property price data at postcode sector level, but we can compare the indices with our 
Census education measure at ward level. Appendix B shows that the educational composition 
variable from the 1991 Census is moderately correlated with the current deprivation 
measures, and does a good job of predicting educational deprivation when instrumented with 
the proportion in social housing. 
Is there any direct evidence that residents prefer more educated neighbourhoods? 
Regressing a ward-level indicator10 of neighbourhood dissatisfaction on the ward proportion 
with high qualifications suggests a 0.01% (s.e. = 0.0047%) decrease in the proportion 
expressing dissatisfaction as the proportion of highly qualified residents increases by 1% – an 
elasticity of 0.016 at the mean. This result is unchanged if we include other key census 
variables – the proportions professional, unskilled, unemployed, non-white, lacking housing 
amenities, in social housing, in agricultural employment, plus household density and average 
property size. The ward proportion with high qualifications is the only statistically significant 
coefficient (at the 5% level) in this regression11. Admittedly, the magnitude of the effect is 
small using this data, but educational composition seems to be one of the stronger candidates 
amongst local factors for a contributor to residents’ self-reported perceptions of satisfaction 
with their neighbourhood. 
 
6.1.3. Assessing the instruments 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4, identification of the implicit price of neighbourhood education or 
neighbourhood incomes requires an instrumental variables approach. The main proposed 
instrument is the postcode sector proportion of households in social housing. Some over-
identification is obtained by including the proportion of these social tenants in ethnic groups 
originating from the Indian subcontinent. Both are highly significant in regional within-area12 
regressions of educational composition on the exogenous variables and instruments, with an 
F- statistic of 240 for Wales and the South West, 392 for the South and East, and 321 for the 
North of England. As the proportion in social housing in 1991 increases by 1%, the postcode 
sector proportion of all residents with diplomas, degrees and above decreases:  by 0.28% in 
the South and East, by 0.17% in the North, and by 0.22% in the West. The within-area R2s 
are 0.32, 0.41 and 0.38 respectively, so the proportion in social housing explains a 
considerable proportion of the local variation in qualifications. Educational attainments 
increase with the proportion of social tenants from Indian sub-continent ethnic groups, except 
in the Northern regions where the relationship is negative. Appendix B presents evidence on 
the proportions of these tenancy and ethnic groups with higher education qualifications. 
Our identifying assumption is that education and incomes of home-buyers and social 
tenants are locally uncorrelated, except through the influence of the proportion of low-
education/low-income social tenants on property prices. Obviously this will not be true over 
larger areas, in which case differences in labour market opportunities and earnings will affect 
                                                 
10 Burrows and Rhodes (1998) combine Survey of English Housing and 1991 Census data to model the 
geographical distribution of neighbourhood dissatisfaction in terms of the percentage of households in each 
ward who say they are very dissatisfied with their neighbourhood. 
11 It is not one of the characteristics used to model the dissatisfaction variable. 
12 Where area is defined as the postcode district. 
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home-owners and social tenants jointly. Estimation within localised geographical groups 
ensures exogeneity of the instruments. Estimates from the 1994 to 1998 Survey of English 
Housing show that mean incomes of neighbouring social tenants and property owners are 
uncorrelated within Local Authority areas. The coefficient in a regression of ward mean 
social tenant incomes on owner occupier incomes is 0.018 (s.e. 0.018). Incomes of private 
tenants and property owners are moderately but significantly correlated with a regression 
coefficient of 0.36 (s.e. 0.064). A further check is available using data on new household 
mortgages in the Survey of Mortgage Lenders data. Regressing the log of income (on which 
the mortgage is based) on the proportion in social housing, with local education and county 
controls, gives us coefficients of –0.135 (0.142) in the North, 0.140 (1.132) in the South East 
and East, and 0.138 (0.309) in the South West and West. The statistical insignificance of the 
coefficients is clear indication that the intrument and home-purchaser incomes are 
conditionally uncorrelated. 
 All the IV models include a Chi-squared test (Sargan test) of model specification 
and the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. 
 
6.1.4. Changes between 1991 and 1995 
 
Complete data on postcode-sector property prices is only available from the Land Registry 
since 1995. The census data on tenancy groups and local qualifications dates from 1991. 
Estimates of a property price model using 1995 prices on 1991 area characteristics will be 
biased if there have been substantial changes in area characteristics since 1991. Clearly, if the 
postcode-sector proportion highly qualified in 1995 is a multiple of the 1991 value, then we 
need to adjust the coefficient on the 1991 proportion downwards, though elasticities will be 
unchanged. However, changes in the distribution of education across postcode sectors will 
result in attenuation of regression coefficients and estimated elasticities. Comparing 1991 and 
2000 deprivation indices at ward level, suggests that the attenuation due to distributional 
changes is probably in the order of 8% – see Appendix B for details of this calculation. 
 
6.2 Implicit price of neighbourhood educational status 
 
6.2.1. Postcode sector data 
 
Table 2 to Table 4 presents the central estimates from the smoothed-spatial effects estimators, 
by three broad geographic regions. In each table, column 1 presents a basic OLS regression 
of log mean property prices in postcode-sector-dwelling-type cells in 1995, on the proportion 
of highly qualified adults in the postcode sector in 1991, dwelling type dummies, mean rooms 
in owner-occupied housing. Column 2 adds controls for ethnic composition and the density of 
purpose built flats. Columns 3 to 6 show estimated parameters and standard errors from the 
smoothed-spatial effects estimator. In column 4 and column 6 the postcode sector proportion 
with high qualifications is instrumented. Instruments are the proportion of households in 
social housing (council and local authority tenants) and the proportion of these social tenants 
from Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. All the tables show estimated 
coefficients and standard errors13. 
To illustrate our empirical method, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the raw and 
smoothed proportion with higher education qualifications in the London area. Figure 2 
                                                 
13 Standard errors for the smooth spatial effect models were checked against bootstrap standard errors for a 
London sub-sample. For a coefficient of 1.398 the standard error was 0.313 or 0.327 when bootstrapped (100 
repetitions). 
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illustrates the function ( )bxm i ,| c  in (7). Estimation is based on deviations of the raw 
proportion higher-educated from this surface. 
The OLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 in Table 2 illustrate the partial correlations 
between property prices and the regressors in the South and East of England. Property prices 
are around 4% higher for each 1% absolute shift in the postcode sectors proportion highly 
qualified. But, these numbers should not be interpreted as structural parameter estimates in a 
model of property price determination. Differences within the region in labour market returns 
to skills and employment opportunities will simultaneously determine property prices and 
educational composition. When we introduce controls for ethnic composition and the density 
of purpose built flats in column 2, these attract positive and significant coefficients. Both 
variables proxy for central London and suburban areas, where property prices are high due to 
the high demand for skilled labour in the Capital. 
As soon as we estimate on deviations from local means using the semi-parametric 
SSE model, the coefficient on highly qualified residents falls dramatically, to 1.22 (0.14) in 
column 3. Taking out the mean differences between localities removes biases in the estimate 
of the implicit price introduced by local labour market driven property price and educational 
composition simultaneity. The IV estimate in column 4 is only slightly below this at 1.119 
(0.218). This is a somewhat surprising result, because any unobserved differences between 
neighbouring postcode sectors in the mean physical characteristics of housing should 
generate variation in mean property prices, and, we might expect, variation in the mean 
education and incomes of purchasers of these properties. The similarity implies that this 
source of endogeneity is not a serious problem. Either there is little variation in the price-
related characteristics of housing in closely associated neighbourhoods, or these differences 
in price are not sufficient to generate differences in mean education between neighbouring 
postcode sectors. The variation in neighbourhood education is exogenous, even before we use 
the instruments. Measurement error in the educational status variable may be another factor 
that leads to higher IV estimates than expected relative to the OLS estimates. The educational 
status variable is taken from the 10% sample of the Census, so the sampling variance is 
high14. The variables used as instruments come from the 100% sample. 
Columns 5 and 6 introduce controls for ethnic composition and flat density. It seems 
possible that neighbourhood educational variation, or variation in social housing captures 
variation in the physical environment which are consumption goods to property buyers. 
Property owners may prefer to live away from council estates because they find high rise flats 
and large estates unattractive. Inclusion of the density of purpose built flats (in 100s per km2) 
in the postcode sector tests for this. Although this variable was significant in the raw OLS 
regressions, it is completely insignificant in the SSE or SSEIV models. Another consideration 
is the effect of ethnic minorities on property values, when there is racial prejudice amongst 
property owners. Ethnic background is associated with educational attainment, so sensitivity 
of property values to ethnic composition will affect our estimated coefficient on educational 
status. When the proportion of black, and Indian ethnic groups is included as a regressor in 
the SSE model (column 5), we find a slight fall (around 10%) in the parameter of interest. In 
the SSEIV model, however, we find no change. Potentially, we require the inclusion of this 
ethnic group control to justify our overidentifying restrictions. The proportion of social 
tenants in Indian sub-continent ethnic groups will not necessarily be a good instrument 
unconditional on ethnic overall ethnic composition (either because of prejudice, or because 
the proportion from ethnic minorities is correlated with mean home-owner incomes). As it 
                                                 
14 Comparison of 10% and 100% sample unemployment rates suggests that 20% of the variance of the 10% 
sample is sampling noise. 
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turns out, the instruments and model pass the test, whether or not ethnic composition is 
included as a main regressor, though the 2χ statistic moves in the expected direction. Perhaps 
the most convincing test of the validity of the instruments is the insensitivity of the IV 
estimate to the inclusion of ethnic group and flat density controls. 
Table 3 shows the estimates for the North of England regional group. Here we see 
much less movement in the parameter estimates as we change from OLS on the entire region 
(columns 1 and 2), to the SSE models. The coefficient on educational composition falls as 
expected, but by nothing like the same amount as in our East and South East sub-sample 
estimates. In the East and South East group, it is probably the high demand for higher-
educated workers and high property prices in the Capital city, relative to outlying areas, 
which generates the high coefficients in Table 2, column 1. In the North, local labour demand 
factors are less important. Nevertheless, the point estimates fall by around 20% once we 
abstract from local area effects. Instrumenting the proportion higher-educated increases the 
coefficient estimates, an effect which can only be attributable to the sampling noise in the 
regressor, but the difference between the SSEIV and SSE estimates of the key parameter is 
not significant in a Hausman test ( ( ) 654.021 =χ ) for column 5 versus column 6). The final 
estimates of our main coefficient are almost double those obtained for the South and East. 
Results for Wales, the West and the South West are much like those for the North. 
On this sample, however, we reject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions 
and model specification are correct (the residuals are correlated with the instrument vector). 
The reason for this misspecification is unclear, but is probably linked to the highly rural 
geography of Wales and the South West peninsula. There is evidence here and in further 
specification checks (see Section 0) that the IV results are untrustworthy. Given the similarity 
between the SSEIV and SSE model estimates in the other regions, we can reasonably assume 
that the non-IV estimates are acceptable here too.  
Comparing the parameters across regions, an obvious point is that the response to 
percentage point changes in the South East and East is markedly different from the response 
to a percentage point change in the other regions. This is, of course, largely due to differences 
in mean education levels between regions. Converting the coefficients into elasticities at the 
sample mean we get 0.211 (0.035) for the South and South East, 0.276 (0.044) for the North, 
and 0.222 (0.041) for the West, SW and Wales 15 16. A minimum distance estimate of the 
elasticities is 0.237 (0.039), and we do not reject equality to the minimum distance parameter 
for all regions (P value =0.356). 
By these estimates, a 1% relative improvement in educational status of an average 
neighbourhood – as measured by the proportion with higher education qualifications – is 
valued at around £230 in year-2000 prices. This response of prices to local education, as 
predicted by proximity to social housing, explains a relatively small amount of the variation 
in property prices within local areas. The R2s in within-property-type-area17 regressions 
suggest that around 5% of the variation in log postcode sector mean prices in the South East 
and East is associated with the proportion in social housing, around 8% in the North and 
4.3% in Wales, West and South West. 
 
                                                 
15 Treating the mean as a constant. 
16 The elasticities are even closer across regions if we constrain the elasticities to be constant within regions by 
estimating a double-log model:  South and SE 0.214 (0.018); North 0.195 (0.013); West, South-West and Wales 
0.230 (0.019). The problem with this specification is that it implies near zero property prices in areas with near 
zero proportions with high qualification, and is inconsistent with the evidence presented on the log-linearity of 
the property-price/proportion-highly-qualified regression line. 
17 Where area is defined as the spatial group represented by a 6km × 6km square. 
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6.2.2. Comparison with property level data 
 
Some readers may feel uncomfortable with results based on micro-spatially aggregated data, 
without any controls for individual housing or owner-characteristics, despite the 
identification strategy employed here. Can we be sure that our neighbourhood educational 
status measure is not simply measuring owner-occupier wealth, which attracts a positive 
coefficient because of unobserved normal-good-type property or area characteristics? Ideally, 
to test the robustness of the results, we want to observe the incomes of home purchasers and 
estimate the models conditional on own household incomes18. As discussed in Section 4, our 
second property price data set from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML) has property 
prices and the household incomes on which the mortgage is based, but no neighbourhood 
identifiers. Nevertheless, we can use it to estimate the relationship between prices and Local 
Authority educational status, for which we have identifying codes. Existence of effects at this 
level of aggregation cannot be taken on their own as evidence of neighbourhood effects on 
property prices. There could be selection into local authority areas by individuals at different 
points in the income distribution, due differing returns to skills in local labour markets, and 
local government factors such as council tax rates. 
The estimates based on matched census-SML data are tabulated in Table 5, for 1997 
property data. Data for Wales is hard to match, so has been excluded. The instrument for the 
local authority proportion higher-educated is just the proportion in social housing. The 
regressions include a broad set of property type interactions and household characteristics, as 
listed in the table notes. Looking at Table 5, and comparing with Table 2 to Table 4, we see 
that the OLS estimates are somewhat higher for the South East and East and the West and 
South West regions, but similar for the North. Instrumenting local education brings the 
coefficient down in the South East and East, makes little difference in the North and increases 
it in the South West and West, but none of these coefficients is significantly different from 
the OLS estimates. If we work with elasticities at the mean and calculate the minimum 
distance estimate from the IV coefficients across all samples and regions we get an elasticity 
of 0.250, with equality across regions (p-value = 0.254)19. The estimates using the SML data 
reinforce the pattern observed by comparing the OLS and SSE estimates in Table 2 to Table 4 
– that selection by education into broader geographical areas is more important in the South 
East and East than in other areas, hence the higher coefficients in this region when we look at 
effects at local authority level. Overall, the coefficients estimated using property level data 
with own income, plus more property and household characteristics, are not inconsistent with 
the estimates of more localised human capital effects in the main tables. 
An important point to note from Table 5 is that the IV estimates are similar whether 
or not we include own-incomes. This is a good indication that the social housing instrument 
is exogenous to home-purchaser incomes, which is what we require. The minimum distance 
IV estimate of the impact of educational status unconditional on incomes is 2.384 (0.413), or 
2.010 (0.352) conditional on own incomes. Without IV, the corresponding parameters are 




                                                 
18 Although own incomes may be endogenous. 
19 We can also use this data to compute the local income elasticity, using within-sample estimates of local 
authority mean incomes. This gives coefficients which are strikingly similar to those in Table 7, with a 
minimum distance estimate across all samples of 0.511 (p-value of test for equality = 0.223). The drawback is 
that the incomes are based on those of new owner-occupiers, not the population. 
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6.3 Sensitivity to bandwidth choice 
 
Since we have no prior information on the ‘best’ bandwidth to use to define the local area 
groups in the SSE and SSEIV models, we need to check how the parameters vary with 
bandwidth choice. We should be worried if the estimates change dramatically for small 
changes in bandwidth, as this would invalidate the claim that this uncovers the parameters of 
a model of property price determination operating at the household level. In principle, an 
optimal bandwidth could be chosen based on a loss function which makes a compromise 
between bias and efficiency – as the bandwidth increases, efficiency increases but at the risk 
of biased parameter estimates. A slightly more ad-hoc approach is to re-estimate the models 
at intervals above and below the 3400 household bandwidth used in the main tables. The 
results of this exercise are in Table 6. 
In all regional groups, the SSE estimates (without instruments) decrease steadily as 
bandwidth is reduced from 5100 to 850 households. This is to be expected, as sampling error 
in the 10% census sample leads to increasing attenuation in the estimated coefficients as we 
remove across-space variation (just as fixed effect estimation in panel data exacerbates 
downward bias due to measurement error). By contrast, for the South East and East, and 
North regional groups the SSEIV estimates are remarkably stable. The IV estimate for the 
South East and East increases by only 8.5%, and the estimate for the North increases by only 
15% as we increase the bandwidth by a factor of 6. Hausman tests of the difference between 
pairs of estimates computed at different bandwidths all fail to reject the null of equality. For 
Wales, West and South West of England, the IV estimates are not stable across different 
bandwidth choices and the Sargan test statistics suggest a misspecification. The non-IV 
estimates are, however, relatively insensitive to changes in bandwidth around 3400 
households, and are consistent with the elasticities calculated for the other regions, so I take 
these as the preferred estimates for this region. 
 
6.4 Non-linearities in response 
 
The estimates presented in Section 0 assume a linear relationship between the proportion of 
residents highly qualified and log mean property prices. Figure 3 shows the result of 
estimating the semi-parametric model of Section 5.3 on the regional groups. It is fairly clear 
that, apart from a few local irregularities, the relationship between the natural log of property 
prices and the generated neighbourhood proportion with higher education is linear, with no 
threshold effects20. Nothing here indicates that people are willing to pay proportionally more 
as educational status increases, though of course, the absolute amount paid increases with 
each one percentage point shift in educational status. In the South East and East region, a one 
percentage point improvement in educational status at the 75th percentile (21% higher 
educated) would be worth around £1600, whereas a similar relative improvement at the 25th 
percentile (11%) would be worth around £1300 (in 1995 prices). Some specification checks 
for this model are presented in Appendix C. 
 
6.5 Implicit price of neighbourhood mean incomes 
 
It follows from this evidence that home-owners are prepared to pay a premium to live in a 
highly educated neighbourhood, that we should find evidence of a premium to high income 
                                                 
20 Similar results are obtained if we estimate a kernel regression of log-property type on the proportion higher-
educated, where the variables are in deviations from the property-type-location means, and where location is 
defined by a 6km × 6km grid. 
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neighbourhoods, unconditional on education levels. Table 7 confirms this prediction. The 
specifications in the columns of these tables are identical to those in the last two columns of 
Table 2 to Table 4, but with log mean postcode sector incomes replacing the proportion with 
higher education qualifications as a regressor. Controlling for spatial variation is important. 
The estimates from the smooth spatial effects models are substantially lower than the OLS 
estimates without area controls (not shown). Except in the North, instrumenting local 
incomes with the proportion in social housing and proportion of social tenants from Indian 
ethnic groups makes little difference to the estimates. Moreover, introducing the ethnicity and 
flat density variables as regressors reduces the estimated elasticity only slightly. The final 
estimates are statistically identical across regions. The minimum distance estimate is 0.519 
(0.054) and we do not reject equality of all parameters to the minimum distance estimate (p-
value = 0.384). Households in all regions pay around 0.5% for each 1% improvement in 
mean neighbourhood incomes. 
 
6.6 Comparing local income and education effects 
 
Can we determine whether income or education is more valued in the neighbourhood social 
environment? Education might be important if residents seek out the productive externalities 
in human capital formation; if income is more important, we might emphasise considerations 
such as lower crime rates and a well maintained physical environment. However, 
disentangling the influences of family income and education on attainments is difficult, even 
using micro-data at the individual or household level. The problem is exacerbated in our 
micro-spatially aggregated data by the fact that mean incomes and education are highly 
correlated21, they are measured in different periods, the income data is partly modelled, our 
education data is based on 10% census samples, and because both are endogenous to property 
prices. 
Firstly, what stands out from these tables, is that the elasticities with respect to 
income are more than double those on education at average education levels. However, these 
values are very low relative to what we would expect if incomes were the principle object of 
preference. We can see this from conventional estimates of the returns to education in the mid 
to late 1990s, which are around 0.3 for higher education qualifications22. Since we have the 
property price-local income equation: 
 
iii yP εβ += lnln  (17) 
 
and an earnings equation: 
 
iii xy νδ +=ln  (18) 
 
then, if highly educated residents in the neighbourhood only effect property prices through 
neighbourhood incomes, we can substitute (18) into (17) to get a coefficient of βδ  on the 
proportion higher educated in a property price equation. Our estimate of β  is 0.51 and, 
assuming most household income is earnings, we know δ is around 0.3, so the coefficient on 
the proportion higher educated in the property price equation would be around 0.15. Our 
                                                 
21 And the raw correlation between incomes and education is 0.72. 
22 e.g. Harkness and Machin (1999). 
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actual estimates are ten-times this figure!23. It seems likely on this evidence, that education is 
valued as a local commodity for other reasons than just its impact on incomes. Mean 
neighbourhood income on its own acts as noisy proxy for the underlying educational status of 
the area. 
 Table 8 shows this more directly. The table shows within-postcode-district IV 
estimates from 1996 property value models 1996 neighbourhood incomes and 1991 education 
on the right hand side. The implied educational elasticity is 0.31, the income elasticity is 0.56 
– slightly higher than our baseline results, due to the use of less accurate area fixed effects. 
Instrumenting both local education and local incomes increases the coefficient on education 
slightly, but the estimated income effect becomes near-zero, negative and insignificant. This 
is despite the fact that the instruments are more strongly correlated with incomes than 
education. This is clear evidence that neighbourhood education levels dominate 
neighbourhood incomes in the preferences of home-buyers. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that an educated neighbourhood offers real social and economic benefits to its 
residents. 
 
6.7 Unobserved neighbourhood heterogeneity 
 
The models presented in the main tables use relatively few right hand side controls, and rely 
on the spatial effects and instruments to achieve identification. As discussed in 2.2, 
unobserved neighbourhood heterogeneity will compromise the interpretation of the estimates 
as measures of willingness to pay for marginal improvements in the neighbourhood, or as 
estimates of the marginal social benefits to education. We can, of course, just include more 
neighbourhood characteristics and observe what happens to the estimated coefficient on the 
proportion higher-educated. 24 
Table 9 presents results from this exercise for 1996. Neighbourhood characteristics 
are derived from the Census. Additional controls are primary school performance as 
measured in the spring of 1996 plus postcode unemployment per household in 1996. The 
table shows coefficients on neighbourhood education or income from separate regressions. 
Row A shows the baseline model, comparable to the results in the main tables, 
Table 2 to Table 7. The results using postcode district fixed effects are 15 to 20% higher than 
those obtained using the semi-parametric model in the main tables. The results in the table are 
discussed below. Section 6.7.4 discusses further results based on property crime rates from a 
small sub-sample of postcode districts derived from the British Crime Survey in 1992. 
 
6.7.1. The supply of owner-occupied and social housing 
 
Negative correlation may exist between property prices and social housing if social housing 
was, historically, built in areas where land prices were low, and where there is strong serial 
correlation in land prices. Row B of Table 9 includes the proportion of households in social 
housing recorded in the 1981 census as an additional regressor, for those postcode sectors 
where at least five enumeration districts match up with enumeration districts in 1991. The 
                                                 
23 If we work with years of post compulsory education an parameterise δ at 0.07 (from the Family Expenditure 
Survey) we find that our estimates are more than five-times higher than expected if incomes alone matter.  
24 Some of these additional characteristics may be endogenous. Consistent estimation of the parameter of 
interest relies on the assumption that conditioning on the vector of neighbourhood attributes is sufficient to 
make the unobserved determinants of property prices independent of local education levels. This is reasonable, 
since the OLS estimates based on within-local-area variation were close to the IV estimates in the main tables, 
even without additional observable neighbourhood attributes. 
24 
1991 proportion in social housing instruments neighbourhood education, or income. Since the 
vast majority of social housing was built prior to 1981, if the historical supply of social 
housing is influencing our results, we would expect the coefficient on the proportion of social 
housing in 1981 to be significant, and for the coefficient on educational or income status to 
fall. In fact, the coefficient on the 1981 proportion in social housing is insignificant, and the 
IV estimates are not significantly different from those in row A using the standard Hausman 
test. 
This procedure also checks effects of social housing on the pre-1981 supply of 
dwellings for owner occupation. If property developers sited lower quality developments near 
areas of social housing, or were more likely to convert houses into flats in neighbourhoods 
close to social housing, or less likely to upgrade dwellings, then the coefficient on 
neighbourhood education may be biased upwards by unobserved differences in housing size 
or quality. Controlling for the 1981 proportion in social housing shows that this is not a 
serious consideration, for properties built before 1981 at least – it is the subsequent measure 
of educational status that is important. A further test for effects from the supply of flats from 
converted properties is to re-estimate the models excluding property transactions on flats. The 
new coefficients in the area reported at the foot of Table 2 to Table 4. Excluding flats 
increases the coefficients slightly, though not significantly so. Again we would conclude that 
the relationship between local education levels and property prices is not attributable to 
unobserved variation across neighbourhoods in the quality of housing supplied. 
An important point to note here is that deterioration in the quality of housing 
occurring as a result of the negative externality from low human capital neighbourhoods – for 
example as poorer home-owners move into the area – does not result in upward-biased 
estimates of the implicit price. Instead, if the supply of housing measured in quality units falls 
back in response to falling demand, then the estimated implicit price, conditional on housing 
characteristics, will under-estimate the impact of the externality. What we want to measure is 
the full derivative of prices with respect to local human capital, including the effect on price 
resulting from property deterioration. 
 
6.7.2. Other environmental and adult characteristics 
 
We can gauge the extent of the importance of unobserved neighbour heterogeneity by 
introducing more neighbour attributes in the regressions. Row B includes some more controls 
– proportions unemployed, the long-term sick, and lone parents – to proxy the type of 
individual typically housed in social accommodation. These are frequently used as indicators 
of area deprivation. These three characteristics ‘explain’ around 75% of the variance in the 
proportion of social tenants, and nearly 40% of the variation in the proportion higher-
educated. Additional regressors are the proportion of residents not at their current address one 
year earlier, the proportion of agricultural workers, the proportion over 65, and household 
density. Controlling for these characteristics brings down the estimated impact of local 
education and incomes, but the elasticities are now almost identical to those obtained using 
the semi-parametric spatial fixed effect models in the main tables. Although unreported in the 
table, it is worth noting that the coefficients on other neighbourhood characteristics have t-
statistics which are less than half those on education and incomes. Elasticities on the 
proportions of lone parents, long-term sick and unemployed are all well below 0.1 (in 





6.7.3. Local schools 
 
In Gibbons and Machin (2001) we report strong local property price effects from primary 
school performance, as measured by National Curriculum Key Stage 2 test results at age 11, 
whilst secondary school has no measurable effect at postcode sector level. Row C in Table 9 
includes the postcode sector mean primary school test results (the proportion achieving level 
4 in the tests), plus the proportion of children determined as having special educational needs, 
or with local education authority statements of special needs. Although these are significant 
in the regressions, the coefficient on the proportion of higher-educated adults or on local 
incomes hardly moves. This suggests that if more highly educated neighbourhoods matter to 
home-owners because of their concern for the human capital accumulation of children, then 
the anticipated input into human capital is operating outside the primary schooling 
environment. 
 
6.7.4. Local crime rates 
 
Good local crime rate data is not easily available in the UK. A crude measure of 
neighbourhood crime can be constructed from the 1992 British Crime Survey, which includes 
575 postcode sector identifiers. The sample size within postcode sectors is small – the mean 
is 21 respondents – and there are only 67 postcode districts with more than one postcode 
sector. A crime rate proxy – constructed as the mean number of property crimes in the last 
year recorded per respondent in each postcode district – attracts a negative and significant 
coefficient (–0.014, s.e =.007) when entered on its own in a postcode district level property 
value model. However, the coefficient becomes near-zero and insignificant (-0.004, s.e. 
0.006) once we control for postcode district education levels. Again, we must conclude that 
local educational status is the more important factor. 
 
6.7.5 Social tenant-specific effects 
 
We can check if it is something particular about social tenants, or properties near social 
housing which generates the observed education-price relationship using an alternative 
instrument – the location of higher education institutions, which generate high education 
enclaves. This is a weak instrument (t-statistic of 1.67 in the prediction equations), and only 
1.5% of the sample sectors have higher education institutions located within them. 
Nevertheless the point estimate of the education effect is almost identical to the national 
average effect implied by the main results. The IV coefficient is not, however, very 
significant (t statistic =1.29). Still, this indicates that we are picking up education related 
effects in our main results, rather than pure prejudice against social tenants. 
 
6.8 Evidence for human capital externalities 
 
As pointed out in Section 3, one prediction from a model where neighbourhood educational 
status generates an externality in the production of children’s human capital, is that the 
implicit price of improvements in neighbourhood educational composition must be increasing 
in family size (treating family size as exogenous). We should find that the implicit price of 
educational status is higher in neighbourhoods with more children per household, or with a 
higher proportion of households with children. By interacting neighbourhood educational 
composition with an above/below median family size indicator in a within-postcode district 
property price model, we find that that the implicit price of neighbourhood educational status 
is 1.845 (s.e. 0.128) in below-median family size sectors, but 2.225 (0.063) in above-median 
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family size sector. The difference is significant (t = 2.66). This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that households value good neighbourhoods because of the benefits to children, 
though there is no direct evidence here that these benefits accrue in terms of children’s 
educational attainments, or acquisition of other productive skills. 
The proportion of home-owners with children is also increasing in the proportion of 
highly qualified residents – once this is instrumented by the proportion of social tenants in the 
neighbourhood. Again this suggests that families with children benefit more from good 
neighbourhoods, and that they are more willing than others to bid up property prices in high-
education neighbourhoods. Regressing the postcode sector proportion of home-owners with 
children on the proportion of residents with diplomas and degrees (where these variables are 
in deviations from postcode district means) gives an insignificant coefficient of 0.006 (s.e. = 
0.025). Instrumenting the proportion with high qualifications with the proportion in social 
housing drives the coefficient up to 0.148 (0.026). A reduction on the proportion of social 
tenants equivalent to a one percentage point rise in the proportion of residents with diplomas 
and degrees is associated with a 0.14% rise in the proportion of home owners with children 
(from a mean of 30%). One interpretation of this is that home-owners with children are 
willing to bid more for marginal improvements in the educational status of neighbourhoods 
because of the impact on the educational attainments of their children. The relationship is not 
evident in the OLS relationship, because low home-owner household incomes are associated 
with larger family size, which obscures the relationship of interest. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
These results demonstrate that neighbourhood property prices respond to exogenous variation 
in neighbourhood education levels and local incomes generated by variation in the local 
proportion in social housing. Households value residence in ‘educationally rich’ and higher-
income neighbourhoods. The estimated elasticities in the average neighbourhood are stable 
across regions, at around 0.24 for the proportion higher-educated, and 0.52 for mean incomes 
– unconditional on education. A semi-parametric, within-area, IV approach identifies these 
effects. We get similar elasticities on local authority educational status using property-level 
micro-data and conditioning on home-purchaser incomes. Our local income elasticity is of 
the same order as the estimates buried in hedonic regressions in the US literature (around 
0.35-0.41). 
Educational differences between neighbourhoods seem far more important than 
incomes – the coefficient on local human capital is much higher than expected if income 
alone mattered, and the income coefficient vanishes once we include education and income 
together in the IV regressions. Using additional Census, school, unemployment and crime 
data, we can see that the sensitivity of prices to local educational status is undiminished once 
we abstract from other observable characteristics of individuals in the neighbourhood. We 
conclude that households place particular importance on the educational status of a 
neighbourhood in choosing a residential location, and that households with more children 
seem prepared to pay more. This highlights the potential importance of community spillovers 
in the production of human capital. These results have direct relevance to the cost-benefit 
analysis of measures to improve the educational status of deprived neighbourhoods, as well 
as to educational policy in general. Unfortunately, without detailed information on 
neighbourhood educational attainments other than higher education qualifications, we can 
make no assessment of the extent to which higher education matters over and above 
education in general.  
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On the assumption that it is the educational status of communities that matters to 
households, we can make a tentative assessment of the long-run social, community-level 
benefits of education and compare this with the private returns. I focus on households headed 
by someone under the age of forty25. Mean household annual earnings for these households 
was around £19000, and the mean property price was £65000 in 1995. A 10% relative 
increase in the proportion of adults with higher education qualifications in 1995 would have 
meant a 1.9% absolute increase in the proportion with higher-education qualifications. 
Assuming the private returns to higher education qualifications are in the order of 25% to 
30%, this improvement in education implies an increase in mean earnings of around 0.53%, 
or £100 on average household income. From the estimates presented in this paper, this 
change in educational attainments would be valued at £1500 at the 1995 mean property price. 
Average mortgage interest rates in 1995 were around 7% and the mean loan period 22.5 
years, so £1500 is equivalent to £130 per annum in mortgage payments. By this calculation, 
the money-metric value of the non-pecuniary benefits to society from an individual gaining 
higher qualification is higher than the mean return in terms of increased earnings. Note, this 
figure is based on changes to the proportion higher-educated only. If we assume that the 
proportion in all post-school attainment groups increases in proportion to the proportion with 
higher education qualifications, then a 10% relative improvement represents a 10% increase 
in the mean number of years of post-school education. Taking a generous estimate of the 
returns to years of schooling as 0.07, this relative increase in mean non-compulsory years of 
education (1.3 years for 25 to 40-year-olds) in 1995, gives a return per household of £170. 
Again, this is similar to our value on the pure community benefits. 
If we believe that households value community educational status purely as an input 
into children’s human capital accumulation, and that parents can transfer income directly to 
children, it follows that the average household, which has one child, expects a 10% relative 
improvement in quality of the average neighbourhood to increase a child’s expected 
household income by around 0.7%26. We can take this is an upper bound to the average 
impact of neighbourhood quality on a child’s future household income. If all improvements 
in income are linked to better individual educational attainments, and returns to education are 
expected to remain unchanged, then parents expect this 10% relative change in 
neighbourhood status to improve their child’s chances of gaining higher education 
qualifications by a similar proportional amount27. This unit elasticity is substantially higher 
than the child outcome-neighbourhood educational elasticities estimated in the 
neighbourhood effects literature, which are in the order of 0.1-0.2 (see Kremer, 1997 or 
Gibbons, 2001). Clearly, not all the expected benefits of a better neighbourhood relate to 
                                                 
25 Sources of the figures that follow are variously:  Family Resources Survey 1995/6, Survey of English 
Housing 1995, Survey of Mortgage Lenders 1995. Age 40 is the 75th percentile in the age distribution of those 
taking out mortgages in the survey of mortage lenders. Returns to education control for gender, ability and 
family background – calculations from National Child Development Survey and 1970 British Cohort Survey, 
but see also Blundell, Dearden, et al. (2000), or Harkness and Machin (1999). Mortgage interest rates in 1995 
were 6.15% according to the 5% Survey of Mortgage Lenders, though the figure given in Building and 
Construction Statistics is 7.83% per annum. Returns to years of education is the figure from a simple regression 
of log earnings on age left full time education, age, age squared and gender for individuals aged 25-40 between 
1992 and 1996 in the Family Expenditure Survey. 
26 The mean number of children per owner-occupier household for owner occupiers headed by someone under 
40 in the Survey of English Housing in 1995 is one. The calculation assumes that expected child’s household 
income is the same as current mean household income, so we just divide the value of the benefits (£130) by 
household income. 
27 Because the change in the proportion of people with higher qualifications necessary to increase earnings by 
0.7% is roughly 2.3%, assuming the return to higher qualifications is around 0.3. The current proportion with 
higher qualifications is tending towards 23%. 
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better earnings-related outcomes for children, or else the existing literature mis-measures this 
effect. 
These back-of-an-envelope calculations are, of course, approximate. Still, the 
message comes across that the residents are prepared to pay for neighbourhoods with higher 
stocks of human capital, and that the aggregate non-earnings related community benefits per 
household are of a similar order to the aggregate private returns per household as measured 
by the increment to earnings from higher education qualifications. It should be borne in mind 
also that the social benefits measured here are only those that accrue locally, so will not 
include spillovers in production, in workplace relations, in technological innovation and in 
other areas where action is at a broader geographical level. Given the size of these effects 
measured here, these community benefits warrant further analysis. Focussing on the private 
returns to education seriously understates the value of education to society, and any policy 
decisions based on these returns alone may result in sub-optimal provision of educational 
services.
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Table 1:  Summary statistics for local incomes, education and property prices 
 South East and East North of England Wales, S-West & West 
 Mean/s.d Min/Max Mean/s.d Min/Max Mean/s.d. Min/max 
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Means of property prices are means of postcode sector means, weighted by sales volumes.  
Means of qualifications and social housing weighted by households. 
Means of incomes are means of postcode sector means, weighted by number of households. 
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Table 2:  Property price response to neighbourhood educational composition, 
South East and East England, 1995 
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- - - - - 
Overall R2 0.685 0.725 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925 - 
Within R2 - - 0.844 0.844 0.845 0.844 - 
P-value test of 
restrictions 
- - - 0.110 - 0.840 - 
 
Dependent variable is log of postcode sector mean property-type price.  
Sample size (sectors x property type) = 9431. 
Min, mean, max bandwidth:  .24 km, 1.27 km, 8.75 km. 
Mean house price = £85437. 
Mean of dependent variable (log-mean-price) = 11.19. 
Mean Eastings 52854, Northings 18343. 
Instruments in columns 4 & 6 are postcode-sector proportion in social housing and proportion of social 
housing tenants from Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. 
Estimate of educational composition parameter is 1.192 (0.222) in column 4 if social housing is the 
only instrument. 
Excluding transactions on Flats and Maisonettes from sample gives estimate of educational 
composition parameter of 1.262 (0.200) in column 6. 
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Table 3:  Property price response to neighbourhood educational composition, 
North of England, 1995 
       





        
Proportion highly 














Density of purpose 
built flats 
(100s/km2) 
- 1.6 e-3 
(0.7 e-3) 










































































- - - - - 
Overall R2 0.782 0.783 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 - 
Within R2 - - 0.818 0.821 0.818 0.821 - 
P-value test of 
restrictions 
- - - 0.192 - 0.276 - 
 
Dependent variable is log of postcode sector mean property-type price.  
Sample size (sectors x property type) = 8081. 
Min, mean, max bandwidth:  .28 km, 1.44 km, 22.90 km. 
Mean house price = £52554. 
Mean of dependent variable (log-mean-price) = 10.77. 
Mean Eastings 41272, Northings 41884. 
Instruments in columns 4 & 6 are postcode-sector proportion in social housing and proportion of social 
housing tenants from Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. 
Estimate of educational composition parameter is 2.253 (0.323) in column 4 if social housing is the 
only instrument. 
Excluding transactions on Flats and Maisonettes from sample gives estimate of educational 
composition parameter of 2.406 (0.264) in column 6. 
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Table 4:  Property price response to neighbourhood educational composition, 
Wales, West and South West of England, 1995 
       





        
Proportion highly 














Density of purpose 
built flats 
(100s/km2) 
- 14.5 e-3 
2.2 e-3 










































































- - - - - 
Overall R2 0.698 0.708 0.888 0.889 0.889 0.889 - 
Within R2 - - 0.816 0.820 0.817 0.821 - 
P-value test of 
restrictions 
- - - 0.000 - 0.040 - 
 
Dependent variable is log of postcode sector mean property-type price. 
Sample size (sectors x property type) = 6058. 
Min, mean, max bandwidth:  0.40 km, 1.69 km, 12.57 km. 
Mean house price = £58119. 
Mean of dependent variable (log-mean-price) = 10.87. 
Mean Eastings 34637, Northings 20930. 
Instruments in columns 4 & 6 are postcode-sector proportion in social housing and proportion of social 
housing tenants from Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. 
Estimate of educational composition parameter is 1.844 (0.322) in column 4 if social housing is the 
only instrument. 
Excluding transactions on Flats and Maisonettes from sample gives estimate of educational 
composition parameter of 1.928 (0.308) in column 6. 
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Table 5:  Property price response to local education:  Survey of Mortgage 
Lenders data, by region, 1997 
 South East and East North West and SW 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       


























R2 0.713 0.711 0.723 0.723 0.699 0.698 
    
Sample size 11085 7110 4367 
Mean log-price 11.306 10.886 11.035 
Mean price £95577 £61369 £70638 
       
 
Dependent variable is log of property price. 
All models include:  main purchaser age, number of males, number of females, bugalow, detached, 
semi-detached, terraced, flat/maisonette (converted), flat/maisonette (purpose built), other dwelling 
type, built 1919-39, 1940-60, 1961-1980, after 1980, new, number of rooms, dwelling type × number 
of rooms, dwelling type × property age, county dummies. 
Minimum distance estimate of IV coefficient on educational status = 2.010 (0.352). 
Test of equality across regions p-value = 0.630. 
Without own-incomes as control, IV coefficients on local educational status are: 
SE&E:  1.681 (0.877), North:  2.353 (0.387), West and SW:  4.008 (1.205). 
Minimum distance estimate = 2.384 (0.413). 
Test of equality across regions p-value = 0.651. 
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Table 6:  Sensitivity of education parameter estimates to bandwidth choice 
 South and East North West, SW and Wales 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       












Overidentification test - 0.28 - 0.93 - 0.452 
Mean bandwidth 0.64 km 0.72 km 0.85 km 
    












Overidentification test - 0.79 - 0.59 - 0.01 
Mean bandwidth 0.90 km 1.02 km 1.19 km 
       












Overidentification test - 0.84 - 0.28 - 0.04 
Mean bandwidth 1.27 km 1.44 km 1.69 km 
    












Overidentification test - 0.619  0.15 - 0.14 
Mean bandwidth 1.56 km 1.77 km 2.08 km 
    
Hausman test (1700 
against 850) 
χ2(1) = 0.00 χ2(1) = 0.075 χ2(1) = 0.74 
Hausman test (3400 
against 1700) 
χ2(1) =0.34 χ2(1) = 0.36 χ2(1) = 5.1 
Hausman test (5100 
against 3400) 
χ2(1) =0.26 χ2(1) = 0.37 χ2(1) = 3.4 
 
Dependent variable is log of postcode sector mean property-type price. 
 
Table shows estimates of coefficients in model of columns 5 an 6 in Table 2 to Table 4 under different 
bandwidth choices. Hausman tests are for tests of parameter equality under different bandwidth 
assumptions. 
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Table 7:  Property price response to neighbourhood incomes, by region, 1996 
and 1999 








       




























































































Overall R2 0.940 0.940 0.898 0.898 0.913 0.913 
Within R2 0.853 0.853 0.820 0.812 0.839 0.840 
P-value test of restrictions - 0.336 - 0.152 - 0.207 
       
Sample size 19445 16241 12486 
Mean log-incomes 3.164 2.941 2.946 
Mean log-price 11.40 10.85 11.00 
Mean price £108797 £58334 £67453 
Mean bandwidth 1.30 km 1.50 km 1.80 km 
        
 
Dependent variable is log of postcode sector mean property-type price. 
Instruments in columns 4 & 6 are postcode-sector proportion in social housing and proportion of social 
housing tenants from Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. 
Reducing bandwidth by factor of 2 gives estimated parameter on educational composition of: 
 0.415 (0.051) in column 1, 0.576 (0.082) IV in column 2 and Sargan test statistic p-value of 0.38. 
 0.761 (0.042) in column 5, 0.571 (0.071) IV in column 6, with Sargan test statistic p-value of 0.22. 




Table 8:  Comparison of education and income effects:  Within-postcode-district 
IV estimates, all regions, 1996 property prices 
    








Sectors × property types  25586 25586 23586 
    
 
Both models include dwelling-type dummies, mean rooms in owner occupied housing, proportion non-
white, purpose-built flat density, postcode district dummies. 
Instruments are the proportion of social tenants, the proportion of Indian subcontinent and the 
proportion of blacks in social housing.  
F-statistic on three instruments in income equation = 1118.87. 
F-statistic on three instruments in education quation = 592.25. 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions p-value = 0.240 (column 3 ). 
 
 
Table 9:  Property price response to neighbourhood:  estimates with additional 
controls 
  Education Log 
incomes 
  Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity 
     
A Dwelling type, year, proportion non-white, average 








 Sample size  24084 -  23550 
B Model A, plus proportion of social households in 








 Sample size  12171 -  12100 
C Model A, plus mid-year unemployment per 
household, household density per km2, proportions 
in agricultural employment, one year migrants, lone 







 Sample size  24084 -  23550 
D Model C, plus primary school performance, 
proportion of pupils with statements and special 







 Sample size  22180 -  22180 
 
1. Dependent variable is log of 1996 property price 
2. School data taken from DfEE 1996 Primary School Performance Tables. 
3. Unemployment counts from Nomis. 
4. All other controls from 1991 census. 
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Figure 1:Raw postcode sector proportion with high qualifications, 1991:  London 
and surrounding area 
 
Figure shows postcode proportions with higher education qualifications in postcode 
sectors in London area, Eastings 50000 to 56000, Northings 15000 to 21000. 
 









Figure 2:  Smoothed postcode sector proportion with high qualifications:  London 

























Spatial bandwidth 1 km, Gaussian kernel 
Eastings 50000 to 56000, Northings 15000 to 21000 
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Wales, West and 
South West 
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8. Appendix A 
 
The justification for using the proportion of social tenants as an instrument for 
neighbourhood education or incomes is that mean incomes and education levels of social 
tenants are unambiguously lower on average than those of owner-occupiers. We can write the 
proportion of any group of residents in location i, with qualifications q as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )sPoqPsqPoqPqP ii ⋅−+= |||  
 
so a first-step linear regression of the proportion qualified, on the proportion in social housing 
gives estimates of the mean proportion of owner-occupiers with qualifications q, and the 
mean difference between the proportion of social tenants and owner occupiers with 
qualifications q. Similarly, for mean incomes 
 ( ) ( )sPyyyy iosoi ⋅−+=  
 
and taking logs: 
 

















++= ln1lnlnln  
 
 
9. Appendix B 
 
9.1 Correlation between Indices of Deprivation 2000 and Census education variable 
 
The table below gives the coefficients from a regression of the deprivation indices on the 
ward proportion of highly qualified residents, taken from the 1991 census.  
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 Association of deprivation indices and standardised Census qualifications 
measure 















































Regressor is standardised box-cox zero skewed transform of 1991 ward proportion 
with diplomas, degrees and above. Regression coefficient gives estimated change in 
standard deviations to one standard deviation change in Census education measure. 
Instrument is 1991 ward proportion in social housing 
 
The variables transformed to zero-skewed, standardised normal variates so that the 
coefficient gives the change in the deprivation index in standard deviations associated with a 
one standard deviation change in educational composition as measured in 1991. The first 
column gives the OLS estimates, the second instruments the 10% census sample based 
education measure with the proportion in social housing (taken from the 100% sample) to 
correct for measurement error. In the third and fourth columns, the variables are transformed 
to give within-census district estimates. Whilst the R2 s from the regressions are moderate (a 
maximum of 0.37 for the educational deprivation index), the coefficients and standard errors 
confirm that the census variable is a reasonable proxy for most aspects of neighbourhood 
deprivation, as measured by the latest data. Given that almost 10 years has passed since the 
last Census, we would expect only moderate correlation between current distribution of 
deprivation and that in 1991. However, based on the IV estimates, wards which were one 
standard deviation below the mean in the proportion of qualified adults are, on average, one 
standard deviation above the mean on the current measure of educational deprivation. 
 
9.2 Tenancy group, ethnicity and high qualifications 
 
The table below shows the proportions with equivalent qualifications to those measured by 
the 1991 census, taken from the Labour Force Survey for England and Wales. The figures are 
shown for 1991/92 and 1994/95. 
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Proportion with high qualifications:  variation by tenancy group and ethnic 
group 
  Census LFS 














1991 0.147 0.150 0.175 0.027 0.027 0.052 
1994/5 - 0.190 0.224 0.036 0.036 0.055 
Source:  Labour Force Survey and 1991 Census 
 
In 1991, only 2.3% of tenants in social housing had higher diplomas, degrees or higher 
qualifications, compared to over 15% in other tenancy groups. Social tenants in the Indian 
ethnic groups do better, with 4.5% gaining these qualifications. The figures show that relative 
positions of social tenants in the educational distribution has changed little since 1991, 
though the total proportion in social housing has fallen by a few percent. There is nothing in 
these aggregate changes to suggest that the use of the proportion of social tenants in 1991 will 
be a bad predictor of educational levels in 1995, or incomes in 1999. Given the relatively low 
level of social housing construction in the early 1990s, and the fall off in council house sales 
we would not expect dramatic changes in the postcode sector proportions in social housing 
over the decade. The stock of social rented dwellings in England and Wales was 4.75 million 
in 1991, 4.66 million in 1995 and 4.44 in 1999. The number of households in the social 
rented sector in England remained relatively unchanged over the period 1991-1999. The 
figures are: 
 
Households in the social rented sector:  England 
1991-1999 
Year Council RSL All 
    
1991 3872 564 4435 
1994-5 3677 767 4444 
1995-6 3494 910 4404 
1996-7 3482 1010 4492 
1997-8 3333 987 4320 
1998-9 3324 1028 4352 
    
Figures are in 1000s 
Source:  DETR Housing and Construction Statistics, 
1999   
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9.3 The effect of changes in educational composition 
 
The most important relevant national changes are documented in the figure beow. These chart 
the growth in the proportion with high qualifications and the fall in the proportion of social 
tenants over the period since the last Census. The figure below shows that the proportion of 
social tenants with diplomas, degrees and other higher education qualifications increased 
from 2.7% in 1991 to 3.6 % in 1994/5- a growth of 33% – whilst the proportion of non-social 
tenancy groups with higher education rose from 17.5% to 22.4%. Overall there was a 27% 
growth in the proportion of those with high qualifications between 1991 and 1994/95. 
 





























Social tenants Others All  
Source:  Labour Force Survey 
 
What are the implications of this change for estimates of the response of 1995 property prices 
to the spatial distribution of education levels as measured in 1991? If all neighbourhoods 
experienced 28% increase in the proportion with diplomas and degrees, then conversion of 
parameters measuring the response to 1991 education levels to measurements of the 
sensitivity to contemporaneous education levels is straightforward. The coefficients must be 
adjusted downwards by 28%, and the elasticities will be unchanged. However, changes in the 
distribution of education across neighbourhoods mean that estimated coefficients and 
elasticities will be downward biased relative to the parameters on contemporaneous education 
levels (the classical measurement error problem). Unfortunately there is no information on 
changes in the ranking and distribution of educational composition between 1991 and 1995, 
but we can get a feel for the scale of the problem by comparing 1991 ward level indices of 
deprivation and the DETR Indices of Deprivation 2000. Various composite indices are 
available from 1991 Census data – the Carstairs, Townsend, DoE, Jarman – though none is 
directly comparable to any of the 2000 indices. Nevertheless, the 2000 indices can explain up 
to 66% of the variance in the 1991 indices. 
 I assume we can write the local proportion of highly qualified persons in 1991 as a 
multiple of true local proportion in year t, plus an uncorrelated error term that grows with 
time.  
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tzz itti ⋅+= εα ,,0  
 
A regression estimate of β  in the model 
 
iitit zy υβ +⋅= ,,  
 















ββ ε  
 
The 2nd term inside the brackets could be estimated as the residual sum of squares from a 
regression of the 1991 measure on the contemporaneous measure, divided by the total sum of 
squares (or 1-R2). Assuming the relationship between local educational composition in each 
period is the same as the relationship between deprivation indices in 1991 and 2000, I 
calculate that 202 zσσ ε is 0.34%. The attenuation on regression coefficients resulting from our 
use of 1991 data as a proxy for 1995 neighbourhood composition is then about 8.5%, whilst 
general growth in the proportion of qualified residents leads to an upward bias of around 
28%. Under these assumptions, we need to adjust βˆ  downwards by around 20% if we wish 
to interpret is as the contemporaneous of ity ,  to iz , whilst the elasticities should be increased 
by over 8%. However, we should bear in mind that a high proportion of property completions 
in 1995 were initiated in 1994, and may be based on the decisions made some years earlier. 
 
 
10. Appendix C 
 
The figure below shows kernel regression lines estimated by the procedure in Section 5.3, for 
the London area, Eastings 50000 to 56000, Northings 15000 to 21000. The bold line shows 
the estimate of the regression line of log-property price on the predicted proportion with high 
qualifications. Analytical and bootstrap standard errors as shown. The dashed bold line shows 
the log of the kernel regression of property prices on the proportion highly qualified. Results 
are mean adjusted so that log of mean property price coincides with mean of the proportion 
with high qualifications. Pointwise standard errors calculated by standard formulae clearly 
overestimate the sampling variability. 
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Bootstrap s.e. Log-price regression Pointwise standard error Log of price regression  
 
Spatial bandwidth 1 km 
Bandwidth on local education 0.018 by Silvermann’s rule of thumb 
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